While most of the previous literature interprets trust as an action, we adopt a view that trust is represented by a belief that the other party will return a fair share. The agent's action is then a commitment device that signals this belief. In this paper we propose and test a conjecture that economic agents use trust strategically. That is, the agents have incentives to inflate the perceived level of trust (the signal) in order to induce a more favorable outcome for themselves. In the experiment we study the behavior of subjects in a modified investment game which is played sequentially and simultaneously. While the sequential treatment allows for strategic use of trust, in the simultaneous treatment the first mover's action is not observed and hence does not signal her belief. In line with our prediction we find that first movers send significantly more in the sequential treatment than in simultaneous. Moreover, second movers reward trusting action, but only if it is maximal. We also find that signaling with trust enhances welfare.
Introduction
In many institutions people transact sequentially and the success of the one-shot interaction often relies on the first mover having trust in the second mover to share the created surplus. An important feature of these trust situations is that the first mover can choose a level of credible (costly) commitment which can possibly reveal information about her degree of trust in the favorable response of the second mover. For example, in an Internet auction, the final price may signal the level of trust that the winning buyer has in the seller's credibility; in labor relations, the size of the salary signals the firm's trust in the ability and the diligence of the worker; and last but not least a co-payment requirement signals the bank's trust (or lack of) in the entrepreneur's ability to pay back the loan. If the second mover can ascertain the level of trust from the first mover's action and responds to it positively, then the first mover may want to manipulate her level of commitment in order to induce the most favorable response. In other words, the first mover strategically enhances trust.
An example illustrating the consequences of signaling trust could be the extensive use of teaser rates in the credit card markets. In recent years the teaser or 0% introductory rates on consumer credit have realized a boom (Ausubel (1999) and Bertrand et al. (2005) ). In the eye of the consumer the 0% rate could represent a trust by the credit company -in fact, one could say that this is the strongest sign of trust that can be signaled through an interest rate. But is it really true that all the consumers that get these offers (even when they are just solicited by getting an "approved" letter) are trustworthy?
Unlikely. The credit firms facing a tougher competition probably rely on these signals of trust in order to attract customers to actually start using their card and accumulate balances. The interest rate is a commitment device through which the firm can "appear" exposed and hence can signal trust. The target consumer may of course like the rate itself, but in addition, she could also value the communicated trust which causes her then to choose that card over others. Thus, as in most other examples, the behavioral effects such as trust signaling can be just what it takes to give a firm the competitive edge or sway a consumer's decision one way or another. 1 While most of the previous literature interprets the action taken by the first mover in these types of scenarios as trust, we adopt a view that trust is represented by the first mover's belief in the second mover returning a fair share. The first mover's action is then a commitment device that could signal this belief. Whether the first mover's action indeed signals trust and how the second mover responds to it is an empirical question. In this paper, we report the results of an experiment that addresses this question by comparing decisions of the first mover in two modified trust games. The only difference between the two games is that in one case the first mover's decision is observable and in the other it is not. In our trust game, the first mover initially chooses an amount t to be sent to the second mover. This amount is tripled and the second mover must decide whether to send half of it back (fair split) or to keep everything for herself (selfish split). 2 When the game is played sequentially, the amount sent is observable and it could be used as a signaling device because the second mover can condition her decision on t. 1 Depending on the circumstances, the signal can also represent means to get business away from a rival in the above scenario. The strategic use of trust is often intertwined with market forces in other real life examples as well. Therefore, they are only meant to illustrate a situation where at least one of the transacting parties has incentives to appear more trusting than otherwise. However, our experiment eliminates the possible confounds and studies the strategic use of trust in its pure form. 2 Fair division in our understanding would correspond to any division which allocates positive amount of surplus to both parties and makes them reasonably happy. At this point we do not want to go into any deeper discussion into the meaning of fairness.
Conditioning the response on t is not possible if the game is played simultaneously because t is not observed.
Our conjecture is that the amount sent by the first mover is a signal of her trust vested in the second mover who then responds to this favorably. 3 If there is this positive relationship between t and the response by the second mover in the sequential version of the game, then the first mover has an additional incentive to inflate the amount sent and appear more trusting. It seems natural that the second mover would like to reward only the genuine trust which reflects the first mover's opinion about how pro-social, fair, or generous the second mover is. However, she would not want to reward the portion of trust that is strategic, i.e., driven by the monetary interests due to the expected response of the second mover. 4 Nevertheless, if the amount sent is observed, then the incentives to appear more trusting could be present (this depends on the anticipated response of the second mover) and hence, the first mover would send more. This reasoning implies hypotheses which we test in our experiment: When t is observable, the ability to signal trust creates a stronger positive relationship (i.e., larger slope coefficient) between the first mover's trust as represented by her belief, denoted as μ, of the second mover's response and the amount sent by the first mover, t, than when t is not observable. This is reinforced by a positive and monotone response to t by the second mover.
Our results provide strong support for the strategic use of trust. There is a significantly stronger positive relationship between the belief μ of the first mover and t in the game where t is observable than when it is not observed. Given this, one would 3 An illustrative example of such a signaling argument is presented in Appendix A. 4 A reader familiar with the theory of sequential reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) ) may see parallel here. In a gift-exchange game with reciprocal agents, a very high wage offered by the first mover could be perceived as unkind by the second mover because it could indicate that the first mover is counting on a generous response by the second mover.
expect that the second mover would reward higher t with higher chances of a fair split.
Surprisingly, this monotone relationship is rejected by the data. In particular, the second mover responds in a very strict manner. If she is fully trusted, i.e., if t is maximal, then she almost always responds with the fair split. However, if she senses any doubt, no matter how small, i.e., t is less than maximal, then she almost always keeps the whole surplus. This brings us to an unexpected observation that the incentives to signal trust in our design are quite extreme: either signal trust all the way or don't signal at all.
The possibility that trust is used strategically gives rise to another interesting question: Is it efficiency enhancing or reducing? Observability of t is an important aspect of many institutions. Knowing its marginal contribution to social surplus may have important implications for understanding and designing institutions. Our design allows us to measure this marginal effect by comparing the average level of t in our two environments, where in one trust signaling is possible and in the other it is not. It may seem natural that signaling trust enhances efficiency because the first mover can increase her chances of a fair split by increasing t. However, this is only one side of the story. First of all, it is a common feature of any signaling equilibrium that no one is fooled by the inflated signals. 5 Secondly, increasing the chances of receiving a fair share (half) comes at a cost of having to commit more resources. Because of this, it may be that no level of t signals sufficiently high trust for the first mover to take the chance and send a positive amount. Therefore, the ability to signal trust can be a double-edged sword. Nonetheless, we have good news; the results of our experiment indicate that the efficiency is higher when signaling is possible. 5 Within the example presented in Appendix A, such equilibrium is derived.
A modified version of the Berg et al. (1995) trust game is a centerpiece of our design. Berg et al. were the first to study trust in laboratory conditions. Their experiment identifies trusting behavior by observing that subjects playing the role of the first mover often send money to their counterpart second movers who in turn often reciprocate by returning positive amounts. 6 Whether the fist mover's decision reflects a degree of trust or rather a variation of risk preferences has been recently looked at by several studies find that variations in risk-preferences are not an important determinant of the first mover's decision in the trust game. More specifically, they argue that trust games measure trust, which is important for us because it implies that there is a close relationship between first mover's trust and the amount sent. Therefore, it is plausible that the first mover could be signaling trust by manipulating t.
There is a large body of literature exploring behavioral foundations of trust.
Recent papers, Ellingsen and Johanesson (forthcoming) and Sliwka (2007) , have proposed explanations for trust that are closely related to our argument. In both papers, agents have individual preferences for the opinions of others. In Ellingsen and
Johanesson, the agent cares about whether her opponent thinks she is fair or not. If she is fair then recognition of others becomes a point of pride for her. She takes a good opinion of her as a compliment and rewards it accordingly. In Sliwka, on the other hand, agents care about opinions that others have about the population in general. Some agents are "conformists," which means that they like to be fair only if the majority of other people 6 There are other possible motivations why players would send and return positive amounts, such as otherregarding preferences (Cox (2004) ) or preferences for increasing social welfare (Charness and Rabin (2002) ). Nevertheless, the behavior of the first and second mover can be seen as 'proxies' for trusting and trustworthy behavior (Charness et al. (forthcoming) ).
are also fair. They care about opinions of others to the extent that it this gives them extra information about the population characteristics.
There are a few other renowned models that interpret trust as a product of rational rely on the theory of guilt aversion. The main idea is that if the second mover is sufficiently guilt-averse, then she will experience a disutility from feeling guilty whenever she "lets her counterpart down," i.e., returns less than what was expected. To avoid guilt, she optimally splits the surplus in a way that matches her belief about what is expected by the first mover. Thus, the first mover can trust the second mover and sends positive amounts if she is sufficiently confident that her counterpart knows about her expectations of a fair division.
Other prominent theories explaining trust are based on the concept of reciprocity (2007)). The basic idea is that because the amount sent creates a large surplus on the side of the second mover, she perceives it as a "kind action" and reciprocates by returning a fair share. It is not hard to imagine that if this perception of kindness is increasing in the level of t (as would follow from any of the three above models), then the first mover may have stronger incentives to invest when the t is observed than when it is not.
While the present paper focuses on signaling trust, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Schnedler and Vadovič (2007) find that a signal of distrust, represented by restricting the agent's action space in a dictator game, negatively affects the performance of the agent.
In their experimental designs, a principal can choose either to trust the agent or to The rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 provides the experimental design. Section 3 describes the procedures, Section 4 presents the experimental results, and Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
The Experiment
Our experiment consists of two treatments in which players A and B play a modified trust game. The first mover, player A, decides how much of her initial endowment to send to her counterpart, i.e., she chooses a whole dollar amount t from the interval between 0 and 10. The amount sent is tripled by the experimenter. The second mover, player B, then decides whether to return a fair split, 3t/2, or a selfish split, 0, back to the player A. 7 Before player A chooses t, we elicit her beliefs about the chances of a fair split in a salient way (see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000)). The treatments vary in the timing of play and thus, in the availability of information that player B has at the time of making her decision. In one treatment, SEQ, players A and B play the game sequentially. Player B chooses the split of the tripled amount only after she observes how much player A has sent. In the other treatment, SIM, both players make their decisions simultaneously. Therefore, player B chooses a split without knowing how much player A has sent.
Let us discuss several features of our design in more detail. First, notice that player's A action space is rich while player's B action space is binary. The reason for this design feature is that we focus on the behavior of player A and want to observe the relationship between her level of trust and a costly message t that she sends to player B. 7 Notice that we are now assuming a particular concept of fairness. A fair split is equal to exactly a half of the generated surplus. This concept of fairness also corresponds to the notion of Shapley value which has been shown to bear empirical validity in experiments, e.g., see Eckel and Gilles (1997) .
Observe that if player A faced just a binary decision to either send money or not, then her action could not signal various degrees of trust. Player's B action space is also important because it determines the belief of player A which we take as a Because player's B decision is simple player's A decision is also simple, which in turn makes our measurement more precise. Moreover, the decision of player B is stated as a fraction in order to make the behavior of subjects comparable between the two treatments.
In our view player's A belief in a fair response from player B and her level of trust are innately related. Therefore, we elicit player's A belief and use it as a measure of trust. The amount t will likely correlate with this belief, but we do not assume that ex ante. We simply consider t to be a costly message. It is the relationship between player's A belief and t that is of interests to us.
The experiment was designed to test three hypotheses. First, we test whether player A signals her trust to player B. In the SEQ treatment where trust signaling is possible, we expect that the rate of increase in t for a given μ is higher in SEQ than in SIM.
H1: The mean t conditional on player's A belief μ is greater in SEQ than in SIM.
Trust signaling is a response to the expected behavior of player B. Therefore, it only pays off if player's A beliefs μ are correct, and indeed player B rewards higher t with higher propensity of a fair split.
H2: In the SEQ treatment, there is an increasing monotonic relationship between t and frequency of fair split decisions made by player B.
Finally, we want to compare the efficiency levels between the two treatments. In SEQ if μ is high it is optimal for player A to send high t (possibly maximal), but if μ is low, it is optimal to send t = 0. Thus, in SEQ trust signaling can have positive as well as negative effect on t. For this reason it is not clear that efficiency as measured by t is higher in SEQ or in SIM.
H3: There is no difference in efficiency between the two treatments.
Procedures
The experiment consisted of eight sessions conducted in March of 2007 at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand. A total of 156 subjects were recruited from economics and mathematics undergraduate courses. Some of the students had previously participated in economics experiments, but none had experience with trust games. Each subject only participated in a single session of the study. On average, a session lasted 50 minutes including initial instructional period and payment of subjects.
Subjects earned on average 18.85 NZD. 8 All sessions were hand run in a classroom.
Each session included between 18 and 22 subjects who were randomly matched into two person groups that consisted of a player A and player B participants. The assignment of these groups was done according to the following process. The classroom was segmented in half such that all subjects of a given type would be located in the same half of the room. The desks for each type were arranged in two rows facing the wall, and thus neither type would be able to see the other when making decisions. The subjects were free to choose any seat upon entering the classroom. Once everyone was seated, a coin was publicly flipped to determine which side of the room was to be which type. The allocation of a player A and player B to a particular group was done by experimenter randomly pairing one subject from each type together.
At no time during the experiment was there direct interaction. Each subject was provided a set of decision sheets that were identical across subjects. Subjects recorded any decisions during the experiment on these sheets. In order to transfer information between matched pairs, the experimenters collected all decision sheets, copied the decisions from one sheet to another, and then redistributed the sheets to the subjects. This prevented the exchange of superfluous information and aided in maintaining the anonymity of individual decisions.
The general structure of the trust game is similar to Berg et al. (1995) . In the first stage of each trust game, players A were endowed with $10NZ. They had to decide how much of this endowment they wanted to keep for themselves and how much to transfer to 8 The adult minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was 10.25 NZD per hour (1 NZD = 0.6943 USD).
their anonymous player B counterpart. This was done by circling one of the whole numbers ranging from zero to ten on their decision sheet. It was common knowledge that any amount transferred by player A would be tripled by the experimenter. That is, players B would receive three times the amount that their player A counterpart transferred to them. In the second stage, players B must decide how much of the tripled amount they want to keep for themselves and how much to transfer back to their player A counterpart.
This decision is restricted to a binary choice of either half or zero. Just as for players A, this decision was done by circling one of the two choices on their decision sheet.
In both treatments we elicited player A's beliefs about their counterpart's behavior prior to playing the game. 9 The protocol used follows closely Dufwenberg and earnings depended upon the accuracy of their prediction. For this task, all subjects were endowed with $5. For every one percentage point deviation from the actual outcome, ten cents was deducted from the $5. Therefore, a deviation of 50% or more resulted in zero earnings. 10 We have two treatments in the experiment, i.e., sequential (SEQ) and simultaneous (SIM) play of the trust game. Four sessions in total were conducted for each treatment. The sequence of events in a session was the following. (1) A coin was flipped 9 To prevent the asymmetry in payoffs, players B had a chance to predict the average answer of players A and were paid for their accuracy in the same manner. 10 It is important to note that in SEQ, player A's belief depends also on an estimate of how much other players A will send as these amounts will affect the responses of players B by the very nature of sequential interaction. An alternative belief elicitation procedure would be to ask about the player A's subjective probability that her paired player B will return HALF. However, this is not verifiable given our design and thus we would not be able to make such procedure monetarily salient.
to determine player types. (2) The instructions were read aloud for the subjects, who followed along with their own copy. To assist in their understanding, a copy of the instructions was also placed on an overhead and any decisions sheets, tables, etc. were illustrated specifically. The subjects were encouraged to ask questions relating to the rules of the game at any time. 
Results
Given our modification to the Berg et al. trust game, we want to verify the robustness of our results to previous studies. instances. In SIM, players B returned ZERO 27 out of 37 (73%) instances. 12 Much like most of the previous literature on trust, we also find very little support for the subgame perfect equilibrium predictions for self-regarding players in our data.
Figure 1: Summary Statistics of Decisions across Treatments
11 Although player's A action space is pictured as continuous, the subjects could invest only whole dollar amounts in the experiment. 12 The difference in the frequency of returning HALF in SIM and SEQ is statistically significant (p = 0.000) using 2-sided Fisher's exact test.
The average beliefs of players A in SEQ and SIM were 51% and 46%, respectively. We expect there to be a positive relationship between player's A belief and the amount t that she invests. To verify this relationship, we run a tobit regression of players' A beliefs μ onto t. The bounds for the tobit estimation were imposed by the experimental design:
[ ]
. We find that the estimated coefficient of μ is positive for SEQ (0.27) and SIM (0.12), and both are highly statistically significant (p=0.000).
Next we turn our attention to Hypothesis 1, which states that the mean t conditional on player's A belief μ is greater in SEQ than in SIM. [ ]
. If the trust signaling hypothesis is true, we will expect that the slope of the regression in SEQ to be higher than in SIM, i.e. β 2 > 0. The estimated coefficients are provided in Table 1 and scatter plot of the data and regression lines (plotted as an estimated latent variable *î i t α βμ = + using the elicited beliefs in the respective treatments) are illustrated in Figure 2 . The estimated slope of the regression in SEQ is significantly higher than in SIM, thus confirming our expectations. 13 □ We now analyze the behavior of players B. Do players B react to the level of t sent to them by players A in SEQ? More precisely, do players B respond to trust 13 Table 1 reports p-values for 2-sided tests estimated in STATA. However, our alternative hypothesis is 1-sided, and therefore, the appropriate p-value for slope is 0.032. signaling by returning HALF with a higher frequency when they observe a higher t as conjectured in Hypothesis 2? HALF compared to 9 out of 28 (32%) when player A sent t < 10.
14 We now compare the efficiency levels between SEQ and SIM. 15 Although we suspect that trust signaling is efficiency enhancing, our intuition about this is not clearcut. In order to subject our conjecture to a stronger test, Hypothesis 3 posits that there is no difference in efficiency between the two treatments.
Result 3: SEQ treatment has a higher efficiency level than SIM treatment.
Support for result 3:
The mean t sent by players A in SEQ and SIM was 6.59 and 5.22
respectively. A two-sided Mann-Whitney test indicates that they are significantly different at the 10% level (p=0.092). It is worthwhile to highlight the source of higher t in SEQ. A closer look at the data reveals that the number of players A who signal trust by sending t=10 (maximal) is significantly higher in SEQ than in SIM (p=0.013, 1-sided 14 From the perspective of this evidence, it is possible that some of our subjects interpreted t <10 as a signal of distrust, rather than t >0 as a signal of trust. However, our experiment was not designed to distinguish between these explanations. Hence, we do not offer a conclusive answer here. 15 We define efficiency as the percentage of maximum potential earnings realized by the subject's decisions. The level of efficiency in our trust game is solely dependent upon the amount t sent by player A because it is only their decision that determines any increase in the size of the pie. The decision by players B determines the distribution of the pie increase.
Fisher's exact test), but the number of those who sent nothing does not differ between treatments (p=0.566). □
The previous result indicates that social welfare as measured by t is higher in SEQ than in SIM. However, are players A actually better off in SEQ than in SIM. This is not obvious because, as shown in result 2, players' A trust signaling efforts are rewarded only if they send the full amount. We compare the income levels of players A across treatments, which is 10.44 in SEQ and 6.89 in SEQ. And thus, players A are indeed better off in the SEQ treatment.
Discussion
We set out to study trust in two environments that allow different degrees of strategic behavior. In the first environment players A and B make decisions in a trust game sequentially and in the second they make decisions simultaneously. In the sequential game player A can signal trust. The structure of the game also implies that player B observes whether she was trusted or not before she makes her decision. Hence, her response will likely depend on player's A action. Therefore, player A has the ability to behave strategically.
In the simultaneous game, the behavior of both players A and B is solely driven by their personal beliefs. More specifically, the trust of player A in receiving a fair response derives purely from her subjective belief about the proportion of fair players B in the population. And thus, player's A beliefs are dependent upon own experiences and biases. Because of the fact that player A's decision is not observable, she has no opportunity to signal trust and thus cannot affect the decision of player B. Hence, we expect that in a sequentially played trust game player A sends more money in order to induce player B to behave fairly than if the game is played simultaneously.
The results of our experiments for the most part confirm our conjectures. We find that players A signal trust to their counterpart players B who in turn reward them by sharing the surplus. However, in the laboratory environment that we created, it is necessary for player A to signal complete trust in order to receive this reward. Therefore, = is a (triangular) distribution with the mean 2/3 and that this is common knowledge. 17 We also assume that player A is riskneutral. 18 Let us begin with the simpler simultaneous moves game which corresponds to our SIM treatment. In equilibrium, due to the lack of extra information about player A's type, player B acts purely on her prior belief about θ and returns HALF with probability
. Player A optimizes given her beliefθ . Because she is risk-neutral, 16 And possibly in the eyes of others. But this is not a part of our model. 17 Even simpler would be to use uniform distribution but that would give us only a trivial outcome because of a low mean. This will become clearer later in the example. 18 This assumption is important because it will produce dichotomous optimal behavior by player A --she optimally sends either 1 or 0. Obviously this is irreconcilable with the empirical data from trust games where we observe much richer behavior. The virtue of assuming risk-neutrality is that it allows us to make our argument in a simple and clear way.
her optimal strategy is to either send all or nothing, i.e., } 
Notice that player A's expectations of receiving HALF are
. Hence, she
. This may at first seem a bit extreme since at most one type 1 = θ would ever send a positive amount, i.e., 1. However, we particularly like this feature because it illustrates nicely our argument. Namely, below we will see that in the sequential game there is a whole interval of types who would send a positive amount due to signaling incentives.
To see that player A may have incentives to signal her type in the sequential environment suppose now that player A moves first and then player B observes t and responds. The behavior just described for the simultaneous game is not optimal anymore.
Some players A will deviate and send positive amounts. To see this suppose that both player A and player B act the same as in the simultaneous game, i.e., send We have just illustrated that signaling with trust can be profitable against a myopic player B. But can this happen in equilibrium? Notice that in the above example the player B's updated belief is incorrect. In equilibrium there are no surprises and player B adjusts her belief accordingly. In other words, she is aware of the signaling behavior.
which denotes the threshold for player A below which she optimally sends 0 and above which she optimally sends 1. In equilibrium player B updates her belief accordingly,
The signaling equilibrium is characterized by θ which satisfies both (2) The example above implies that one could identify signaling behavior in our experiment by comparing the relationship between individual types (θ ) of subjects and their amounts sent (t) for our two treatments and find that the relationship is steeper in the sequential game. Indeed this is something we would like to do, but we cannot do it directly. The reason is that we cannot directly measure individual types (θ ), the private beliefs of subjects about the proportion of self-regarding individuals in the population.
Rather, what we can and do measure are "average trust levels" or, in other words, the overall beliefs that players A have regarding the average response of players B in the room. It is apparent from the example that these are not the same. 
where all expectations are taken with respect to θ . However, also notice that the equalities in steps 2 and 4 will break if σ is either a convex or a concave function (because of Jensen's inequality). Thus, the beliefs of the players A may be biased in the upper (if σ is concave) or the lower (if σ is convex) direction. In our data we test for the difference in the distributions of beliefs for our two treatments and cannot reject the hypothesis that they are the same using Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.528) which gives us a certain level of comfort and confidence in our results.
You are a Player A ID#:____
Task 1 Instructions for Player A
In task 2, the initially described two stage game is played sequentially. That is, player A makes their transfer decision and then player B makes their transfer decision after being able to see how much player A transferred to them. Therefore, player B is going to make their decision knowing how much player A has transferred to them.
For task 1, you must answer the following question:
After seeing how much is transferred to them from player A, what is the percentage of players B in the room that will return HALF of the amount that they receive, i.e. HALF of the tripled amount that is transferred to them from player A counterpart?
Your payout will depend on your accuracy. The payout is calculated as follows:
You will start with $5. For every percentage point (1 % point) of mistake, 10 cents will be deducted from this $5. The mistake is the absolute value of (your answer -the actual percentage). For example, if you answer accurately, you will get $5. If you miss by 20% points (i.e., your answer is either twenty percentage points too high or twenty percentage points too low), you will be paid $3 (500 -20 x 10 = 300). If your mistake will be larger than or equal to 50% points, then your earnings from this task will be zero.
I believe that ……… % of players B in the room will return HALF of the tripled amount.
Task 2 DECISION SHEET
Player A begins with $10. Player B begins with $0.
Each dollar that Player A gives to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter.
The decisions of both players will be made sequentially. Therefore, player B will know how much player A has transferred to player B before player B makes their decision of whether to return HALF or ZERO. Each dollar that Player A gives to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter.
The decisions of both players will be made sequentially. Therefore, player B will know how much player A has transferred to player B before player B makes their decision of whether to return HALF or ZERO. 
Task 1 Instructions for Player A
In task 2, the initially described two stage game is played simultaneously. That is, player A makes their transfer decision at the same time that player B makes their transfer decision back to player A. Therefore, player B is going to make their decision without knowing how much player A has transferred to them.
Without knowing how much player A has transferred to them, what is the percentage of players B in the room that will return HALF of the amount that they receive, i.e. HALF of the tripled amount that is transferred to them from player A counterpart?
Task 2 DECISION SHEET
The decisions of both players will be made simultaneously. Therefore, player B will not know how much player A has transferred to player B before player B makes their decision of whether to return HALF or ZERO. Each dollar that Player A gives to Player B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter.
The decisions of both players will be made simultaneously. Therefore, player B will not know how much player A has transferred to player B before player B makes their decision of whether to return HALF or ZERO. 
